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Emigrating from Mexico to the United States requires three steps:
going to the border, crossing it, and going to the final U.S. destination.
This article attempts to measure the earnings benefits of each migration
step, focusing particularly on the second step: crossing the border.
Using U.S and Mexican microdata of workers living in Mexico and in
the United States, this article compares wages of identical individuals
on both sides of the border after controlling for unobserved differences
between migrants and nonmigrants. On average, Mexican workers
increase their wages 1.22 times by moving to the Mexican side of the
border, 4.15 times by crossing it, and 1.12 times by moving to an interior
location in the United States. Gains are larger for unskilled workers.
Also, gains for crossing the border are larger for illegal workers, while
gains for going to the U.S. interior are larger for legal workers.
Keywords: Migration, Wage, United States, Mexico, Border.
Emigrar de México a los Estados Unidos requiere tres pasos: ir a la
frontera, cruzarla e ir al destino final en los Estados Unidos. Este
artículo calcula las ganancias salariales en cada paso, enfocándose
particularmente en el segundo paso: cruzar la frontera. Utilizando
microdatos de México y de los Estados Unidos, este artículo compara
los salarios de trabajadores idénticos en ambos países después de
controlar por características no observables de los migrantes y los no
migrantes. En promedio, los trabajadores mexicanos incrementan su
salario 1.22 veces al migrar al lado mexicano de la frontera, 4.15 veces
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al cruzarla, y 1.12 veces al migrar de la frontera al interior de los
Estados Unidos. Las ganancias son mayores para trabajadores no
calificados. Las ganancias de cruzar la frontera son mayores para los
trabajadores ilegales, mientras que las ganancias de ir al interior de los
Estados Unidos son mayores para los trabajadores legales.
Mexican–U.S. migration has a long history, but the dynamic of such
population flow has changed through time. These days, Mexican workers
migrate to the United States from virtually every corner of Mexico and live in
virtually every city or town of the United States. For example, rural agricultural
workers from specifically located areas of the Mexican states of Michoacán,
Jalisco, Guanajuato, and Zacatecas1 have traditionally worked the fields of the
U.S. states of California and Texas, while better-educated workers from
Mexican cities, such as Mexico City or Monterrey, work in large U.S. cities,
such as Chicago or New York. Social migration networks have also changed
from the traditional migration states in the mid-west of Mexico to every place in
the country. Such social migration networks have been—and continue to
be—the main channels individuals use to find their way to the United States. So,
it is not surprising that very well-defined migrant enclaves exist in almost all
U.S. cities and towns and come from specific Mexican villages and towns (Card
and Lewis 2007; Durand, Massey, and Zenteno 2001).
Mexican migrants arrive to the United States via every possible means of
transportation: plane, bus, boat, or even on foot. And, of course, they come
whether their migration is legal or not. Most times, migrants plan in advance
their whole trip and know their final destinations, helped and encouraged by
relatives and friends in both countries. However, the Mexican side of the United
States–Mexico border is full of individuals who were not able to cross the
border, who are waiting for the correct time to cross it, who were deported and
abandoned by the U.S. border patrol in the Mexican border cities and are not
able to go back to their hometowns in Mexico, or who were deported and are
waiting to reenter the United States (Anderson and Gerber 2007; Durand and
Massey 2004).
In their attempts to migrate to the United States, migrants have to complete
three steps: (1) moving within Mexico from their places of origin to the Mexican
side of the United States–Mexico border; (2) crossing the border; and (3)
moving within the United States to their final destinations. Each step has a cost
and therefore a benefit. Each step represents a different challenge and takes a
different amount of time. But all three steps together represent the journey a
migrant has to take to start a new life in a new country.
1 These states have had high U.S. migration rates since the end of World War II, specifically since
the start of the Bracero Program. The Bracero Program was created to satisfy the growing
demand for agricultural laborers in the United States during World War II. The program ended
in the early 1960s, but social networks remained long after.
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The main objective of this article is to disentangle the wage gains of the
Mexico–United States migration to associate those gains with each one of the
three steps. Which of the three migration steps provides the largest increase in
earnings? And do different steps benefit certain types of migrants more than
others?
The Mexican–U.S. case allows us to compare the benefits of moving gained
from two different forms of migration: those involving financial costs and those
involving other (legal and cultural) costs. The first step of the migration from
Mexico to the United States may require significant transportation costs (as well
as courage) but does not require getting special working permits or learning a
new language, new skills, or new culture. Crossing the border represents
no transportation costs but certainly carries other costs.2 To cross the border
requires getting a visa orwork permit or hiring a smuggler (and risking your life).3
Finally, moving from the U.S. side of the United States–Mexico border to a
place in the interior of the United States requires, in addition to transport costs,
learning a new language and living in a different culture. These last costs are so
substantial that many Mexican migrants “stop” at the U.S. side of the United
States–Mexico border (Orrenius, Zavodny, and Lukens 2008).
Which step generates larger wage differentials for migrants? Using
microdata from the American Community Survey (ACS) of 2008 and the
Mexican Survey of Occupation and Employment (Encuesta Nacional de
Ocupación y Empleo [ENOE 2008]) of the same year, this article computes wage
differentials for identical individuals working in the interior of Mexico, at the
U.S.–Mexican border, and in the interior of the United States.4 Wage
differences are calculated controlling always for unobserved differences in the
productivity of migrants and nonmigrants.
In addition, wage differentials for every migration step can be calculated for
different categories of migrants, such as men and women, people of different
ages, and workers with different levels of schooling. Making such calculations
allows us to know whether all workers gain the same wage increases by going to
the border, crossing the border, or going to the interior of the United States.
Therefore, we can determine which groups of migrants may be better off staying
at the Mexican side of the border and which groups are consistently better off
crossing it.
2 Cross-border cost may not reflect the cost of crossing the border for illegal migrants because the
labor markets of twin cities in the border region are, to a certain extent, integrated. They are
integrated by the presence of international outsourcing plants known as “maquiladoras” that
distribute jobs according to the relative supply of categories of workers and by cross-border
commuting.
3 There exist also other benefits for crossing the border, such as the lack of opportunities inMexico
or a better future for children.
4 By “identical,” we mean that individuals share observable characteristics, such as gender, age,
education, and occupation. In the fourth section of this article, we note the difficulties of finding
exactly identical groups of workers to compare and explain how we adjust our calculations to
account for this challenge.
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A second goal of this article is to compare wage differentials at the border
region with wage differentials for the whole of both countries. Does a smaller
wage differential at the border region imply economic integration at the border?
Does economic integration at the border suggest future integration for the
rest of the two countries? Is the border region a “lab exercise” for supporting
larger flows of workers between Mexico and the United States? Even though
these questions cannot be answered formally in this article, comparing
Mexico–United States wage differentials at the border and in nonborder regions
will help us gain a better understanding of such issues.
In brief, our findings indicate that Mexican-born, Mexican-educated
workers in the United States earn, on average, 5.34 times the wage of identical
workers in Mexico. On average, migrants (both legal and illegal) increase their
wages 1.22 times by migrating from their origin places inMexico to theMexican
side of the United States–Mexico border, 4.15 times by crossing the border, and
1.12 times by going to their final destinations in the interior of the United States.
For illegal migrants, the wage gain for going to the interior of the United States
is considerably smaller than for the legal ones; however, the wage gain for
crossing the border is almost the same for legal and illegal migrants. This result
may explain why wages on the U.S. side of the United States–Mexico border are
lower relative to wages in the interior of the United States.
The rest of the article is organized as follows: the second section reviews the
existing literature on Mexican–U.S. migration, the third section describes the
current flows of Mexican migrants to the United States and averages regional
wages and worker characteristics, the fourth section presents the selection
model and some applications in the international migration literature, the fifth
section reviews the empirical application and the results, and the sixth section
concludes.
Background and Literature Review
Mexican–U.S. migration has been widely studied, especially in recent
decades. The work of Durand, Massey, and Zenteno (2001) presents a
comprehensive description of the migration dynamic between Mexico and the
United States. The authors observe a very stable geographic distribution of
the international migration flows. International migrants come mainly from the
West and Center of Mexico and are generally working-age males. Hanson
(2006) reviews the factors behind recent increases in migration fromMexico and
suggests that the growth of the relative size of Mexico’s working-age
population, the greater volatility in United States–Mexico relative wages, and
recent changes in U.S. migration policies are all candidate explanations. Card
and Lewis (2007) explore the widening geographic distribution of Mexican
immigrants in the United States during the last two decades and conclude both
demand and supply effects. Both effects are associated with changes in industry
concentration demand and labor skills supply. Additionally, Orrenius,
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Zavodny, and Lukens (2008) compareMexican migration to the U.S. side of the
border with migration to the U.S. interior and find that border migrants are
more likely to be female, to have first migrated within Mexico, and to lack
migrant networks as compared with migrants to the U.S. interior.
Differences between Mexican immigrants and natives of the United States
have also been widely studied. For example, Trejo (2003) found that even
though men of Mexican origin earn considerably less than whites, most of these
differences are explained by the immigrants’ relatively low levels of education.
Livingston and Kahn (2002) show that such differences decrease from the first
to the second generation but apparently stall in the third generation. Blau and
Kahn (2007) observe that gender differences should be taken into account when
comparing Mexican immigrants and whites. The authors find that immigrant
women are more likely to be married with a spouse present and to have higher
fertility rates than U.S. natives, and to present a lower labor supply than U.S.
natives.
Feliciano (2001) compares earnings and education levels of Mexican
immigrant workers with those of their American counterparts and observes that
such differences have decreased through time. However, Borjas and Katz (2007)
comment that the wages of Mexican immigrants in the United States and their
native-born counterparts converge at a much weaker rate than the wages of
other immigrant groups converge with U.S. natives. Dávila and Mora (2008)
found that even though workers along the U.S. side of the United
States–Mexico border earn less than those in the U.S. interior, the average
earnings of Mexican immigrants along the border improved in the past decade
relative to those accrued by their counterparts in the U.S. interior.
Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) compare earnings and education levels of
Mexican immigrants in the United States with those of Mexicans who stay
in Mexico. The authors conclude that Mexican immigrants are, on average,
more schooled than Mexican residents (although they have much lower levels
of human capital than Americans). However, not much study has been done
with respect to relative wages (or earnings) of Mexican immigrants in the
United States and Mexican residents. This article is an attempt to study such
earnings differences, controlling always by observed and unobserved worker
characteristics.
Neo-classical theory states that regional earnings differentials should
disappear over the long run for various reasons. One reason is labor migration
from low-wage areas to high-wage areas; however, perfect mobility of workers
and perfect information should be assumed. Another reason is capital flows to
regions with relatively low labor costs. In this case, perfect mobility of capital
and perfect information should be assumed. A third reason is the ability to
produce cheaper goods and services in the low-wage areas, which allows
competitively advantaged local industries to export their products, increasing
their labor demand and consequently increasing wages. In this case, perfect
mobility of goods and perfect information should be assumed.
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However, workers, capital, and goods are not perfectly mobile. Transport
and legal costs may deter the flows of people, capital, and goods, as may
regional differences, such as amenities, local taxes, and cultural backgrounds.
The three steps of the Mexico–United States migration journey allow us to
study and compare how wage differentials adjust under two different migration
scenarios: when transport costs are high but no legal costs are incurred and
when legal costs are high but no transport costs are involved.
Data and Average Population Differences
We use microdata from the Mexican Survey of Occupation and
Employment (ENOE) of 2008 and the ACS of 2008. The Mexican database
ENOE is a quarterly survey aimed at identifying occupational characteristics
from the Mexican population. It provides information about 124,000 families
that lived in Mexico in 2008. The ENOE includes individual and family
socioeconomic characteristics, such as age, education, employment status,
wage, and hours worked, as well as some migration characteristics. The
ENOE is a large database, significant for every state of Mexico and for some
large cities, including the northern border cities of Tijuana, Mexicali, Ciudad
Juárez, Nuevo Laredo, Reynosa, and Matamoros.5 The ACS of 2008 includes
1,304,000 families living in the United States in 2008 and also reports
individual and family socioeconomic characteristics, as well as some migration
characteristics. The ACS is significant for every state of the United States
and for all communities larger than 100,000 inhabitants, including southern
border cities, such as San Diego, Calexico, El Paso, Laredo, McAllen, and
Brownsville.
Table 1 reports some averaged characteristics of the populations of Mexico
and the United States, paying special attention to the United States–Mexico
border region (Tijuana-San Diego, Mexicali-Calexico, Ciudad Juárez-El Paso,
Nuevo Laredo-Laredo, Reynosa-McAllen, and Matamoros-Brownsville). All
monetary numbers are in U.S. dollars as of 2008.
The total population of the considered border cities is about 11 million, with
6.3 million living in the Mexican border cities and 4.5 million living in the U.S.
border cities. The Mexican border cities represent 5.8 percent of the total
population of Mexico (108 million), while the U.S. border cities represent 1.5
percent of the total population of the United States (304 million). Inmigration
in this region is larger than that in the rest of Mexico or in the rest of the United
States. Forty percent of the population of the Mexican border cities is
inmigrants compared with 20 percent in the rest of Mexico. Forty-six percent of
5 ENOE’s general purpose is to provide representative national data about the occupational
characteristics of Mexicans, while its particular objective is to provide a wide description of
occupational status, inscription to labor force, and socio demographic profiles. Data entries refer
to the last week before the survey was conducted.
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the population of the U.S. border cities is inmigrants compared with 45 percent
in the rest of the United States. Inmigrants to the Mexican border cities come
mainly from the interior of Mexico. About 50 percent of inmigrants to the U.S.
border cities come from the rest of the United States, and 50 percent come from
a different country. Of those from a different country residing in the U.S. border
cities, 45 percent are Mexicans.
Education levels in the two countries—and in the cities on both sides of
the border—are considerably different. The average schooling level of a
worker in the United States is 13.4 years, while the average schooling level of
a worker in Mexico is 9.7 years. The average schooling level of a Mexican-
born worker in the United States is slightly lower than her or his counterpart
in Mexico (9.6 years versus 9.7). The average schooling level of a worker in
the U.S. border cities is around 3.5 years higher than her or his counterpart in
the Mexican border cities (13.0 years versus 9.6). However, while Mexican-
born workers in the U.S. border cities are less educated than all workers on
the U.S. side of the border (10.5 years versus 13.0), they are more educated
than their conational workers on the Mexican side of the border (10.5 years
versus 9.6).
Hourly wages are also considerably larger in the United States than in
Mexico. On average, a domestic-born, domestic-educated worker in the United
States earns $19.52 per hour compared with $2.60 per hour for a domestic-
born, domestic-educated worker in Mexico. (The U.S. wages are 7.5 times
higher.) However, such differences are not so large when comparing Mexican-
born workers on both sides of the border. On average, before controlling for
differences in skills and unobserved productivity, a Mexican-born worker in
the United States makes $12.77 per hour compared with the $2.60 that a
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Mexico United States
Border Total Border Total
Population (million) 6.3 108.1 4.5 303.8
Education (years) 9.6 9.7 13.0 13.4
Mexican-Americans 12.8 12.6
Mexican born 10.5 9.6
Wage/hour (dollars) 2.95 2.60 18.27 19.52
Mexican-Americans 14.70 16.13
Mexican born 12.53 12.77
Inmigration rate .40 .20 .46 .45
National .23 .33
International .22 .12
Mexican .10 .04
Source: Own estimations with data from American Community Survey (2008) and Encuesta
Nacional de Ocupación y Empleo (2008).
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Mexican-born worker can make in Mexico (a ratio of 4.91).6 Within the border
region, a worker in the Mexican border cities makes, on average, $2.95 per
hour while a Mexican-born worker in the U.S. border cities makes $12.53 per
hour (a ratio of 4.24). Given that Mexican-born workers on the U.S. side of
the border are more educated than Mexican-born workers on the Mexican
side, this difference may get smaller when comparing similar individuals. The
next section explains the methodology to control for such observed and
unobserved differences.
The Model
As noted, the first aim of this article is to compare wages of identical
individuals living in Mexico and in the United States. However, a core problem
arises when estimating such individuals’ wage differences. Wages at different
places cannot be observed simultaneously for the same individual, so we need
to use the earnings of a comparison group, but the groups being compared
might be biased by self-selection. Workers with identical characteristics (e.g.,
young, male, Mexican-born, Mexican-educated gardeners) are not randomly
distributed across both countries or along both sides of the border. Plus,
Mexican immigrants in the United States may have unobserved characteristics
that make them different from the Mexicans who stay in Mexico. Such
differences may encourage them to travel to the United States and stay, and
even though such differences are unobserved, they do have effects on their
observed wages.
Obviously, large wage differences exist between Mexico and the United
States. The selection of unobservable determinants of productivity may explain,
at least in part, the observed wage differentials between observable identical
individuals. Selection differences can be generated by the migrants themselves
and by migration policies and laws.7
To control for the problem of self-selection and obtain comparable wages
adjusted for workers’ productivity on both sides of theMexican-U.S. border, we
6Other studies that compare earnings among different countries or specifically between Mexico
and the United States present diverse results. For 1990, Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) present a
United States–Mexico wage ratio of 10.20 for men and 7.12 for women. For 1994, Rama and
Artecona (2002) compound a ratio of 6.57. For 1995, Freeman and Oostendorp (2000) come up
with a ratio of 2.78, and for 2006, Hoefort and Hofer (2007) calculate a ratio of 7.49 for
Mexico City. Comparing wages for Mexican workers in Mexico and the United States,
Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) present a wage ratio of 5.60 for men and 4.98 for women in 1990
while Clemens, Montenegro, and Pritchett (2008) compute an unadjusted wage ratio of 3.82 for
1999.
7An additional factor that may cause wages of identical workers to differ on both sides of the
border is called “natural” barriers. Workers may require higher wages to compensate for the
difficulty of learning a new language, being away from their families, and learning how to live in
a new culture, as well as the direct costs of travel (Clemens, Montenegro, and Pritchett 2008).
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follow the standard two-step procedure of Heckman (1979). Following Mincer
(1976), wages are mostly explained by individual characteristics, such as
experience, education, and gender, as well as other local characteristics, as
follows:
ln w X Zi i i i( ) = + + +θ θ θ ε0 1 2 (1)
where ln(wi) is the natural logarithm of the wage of individual i, Xi are
individual characteristics, Zi are other local characteristics, and ei is the
residual.
However, using the estimated parameters of equation 1 to impute wages for
a different group of individuals may generate distortions caused by missing
information.
Mincer’s (1976) equations at both sides of the border for individual i can be
defined as:
ln w X ZMi M M i M Mi Mi( ) = + + +θ θ θ ε0 1 2 (2)
ln w X ZUSi US US i US USi USi( ) = + + +θ θ θ ε0 1 2 (3)
where wMi is the wage of worker i in Mexico and wUSi is the wage of the same
worker i in the United States. Xi are her individual characteristics. ZMi and ZUSi
are local characteristics for worker i in Mexico and the United States,
respectively.
IfMexican workers are not randomly distributed at both sides of the border,
wage equations 2 and 3 are missing important information (i.e., workers’
productivity and other unobservable characteristics), and ordinary least squares
estimation delivers biased and inefficient coefficient estimators.
Heckman’s (1979) methodology inserts a selection correction variable into
the regression equations 2 and 3 that controls for such missing information, as
follows:
ln w X ZMi M M i M Mi i Mi
Mi
Mi( ) = + + + +( )θ θ θ λ ησ
σ
0 1 2 2 1 2
2 ˆ (4)
ln 0 1 2 2 1 2
,w X ZUSi US US i US USi i USi
Mi
Mi USi( ) = + + + +( )θ θ θ λ ησ
σ ˆ
(5)
where E (hMi) = 0; E (hUSi) = 0.
Such a correction variable is called the “inverse Mills ratio” (li) and can be
proved to generate efficient and unbiased estimators for all the other
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parameters.8 Inverse Mills ratios are computed for migrants and nonmigrants
using the individuals’ probabilities of being part of each group.
Equations 4 and 5 are estimated by maximum likelihood, and according to
Lee (1982), this two-stage estimation procedure results in unbiased, efficient,
and consistent estimates.9
Empirical Estimations and Results
We include in our regressions male and female Mexican-born workers
between 16 and 65 years old who worked at least 20 hours a week and present
positive labor earnings either in Mexico or in the United States. To estimate
selection-corrected wages for migrants and nonmigrants, we need to estimate
first the inverse Mills ratio. We estimate the probability of having been part of
the migrant group using a Probit regression with age, age squared, gender, years
of schooling, marital status, family size, number of children in the family, and
possession of health insurance as the independent variables.10 Table 2 presents
coefficient estimates of this Probit regression for the three mentioned migration
steps: (1) the probability of moving from any place in Mexico to the Mexican
side of the United States–Mexico border; (2) the probability of moving from the
Mexican side of the border to the U.S. side of the border; and (3) the probability
of moving from the U.S. side of the border to any place in the United States.11
8 The wage in the United States for Mexican worker i is observed if qM0 + qM1Xi + qM2ZMi + eMi > 0.
In other words, worker i will decide to work in the United States if his or her net
gains for moving to the United States are larger than his or her net gains for staying in
Mexico. In this case E (eUSi)  0 and the term E (eUSi | eMi > - qM0 - qM1Xi - qM2ZMi) must be
estimated and added to equation 3. Similarly, E (eMi)  0 and the term E (eMi |
eMi > - qM0 - qM1Xi - qM2ZMi) must be estimated and added to equation 2. As Heckman shows,
E X ZUSi Mi M M i M Mi i
Mi
Mi USiε ε θ θ θ λ
σ
σ> − − −( ) =( )
−
0 1 2 2 1 2
, ,E X ZMi Mi M M i M Mi i
Mi
Miε ε θ θ θ λ
σ
σ> − − −( ) =( )
−
0 1 2 2 1 2
2
, and
λ φφi
i
i
f
F
=
( )
− ( )1 . Where φ σ
θ θ θ
i
X Z
Mi
M M i M Mi
=( )
− − −
2 1 2
0 1 2 . f and F are, respectively, the density and distribution
function of the standard normal distribution.
9 For further discussion of the estimation procedure and its theoretical properties and conditions,
refer to Lee (1982).
10 The selection of the instruments is based on their ability to explain migration without been
correlated to workers’ earnings. Marital status, family size, and children at home are not related
to earnings and are commonly used in the literature to control for the migration effect. However,
with the exception of marital status, these characteristics could be different for the same individual
before and after he or she migrates. Age, gender, and schooling are also commonly used as
instruments in the literature; although these variables are correlated to earnings (and gender and
schooling are also included in the earnings equations), they do not change for the same individual
before and after he or she migrates. Possession of health insurance may be correlated with income;
however, this variable is also correlated with the worker’s well-being, beyond his or her capacity
for income.
11 The cross-border regression includes six city-pair dummies to control for possible regional
differences along the United States–Mexico border. The control dummy is the rest of the border
cities and towns.
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In addition, we estimate the probability of moving from any place in Mexico to
any place in the United States.
In all steps, Mexican migrants tend to be older than nonmigrants. Women
and single workers are more likely to cross the border but not to migrate to the
Mexican side of the border or to migrate to the interior of the United States.12
Education decreases the probability of going to the Mexican side of the border
or going to the interior of the United States but increases the probability of
crossing the border. Also, education increases the probability of moving from
any place in Mexico to any place in the United States. Workers living in large
families are more likely to migrate to the United States but not to migrate to
the Mexican side of the border. Presence of children in the family increases the
probability of going to the Mexican side of the border but decreases the
probability of going to the interior of the United States. Workers with health
insurance benefits prefer to migrate within the same country but not from one
country to the other.
With the coefficient estimates of the Probit regression, we compute the
inverse Mills ratio for every migration step. Once the inverse Mills ratios are
12 This result corroborates the findings of Orrenius, Zavodny, Lukens (2008).
Table 2. Probit Regression Equation 6, Mexican-Born Workers
Mexico to
Border
Cross
Border
Border to
United States
Mexico to
United States
Age -.003 .024** .020** .074**
Age squared .000* .000 .000** -.001**
Gender .008 -.166** .234** .137**
Education -.030** .049** -.043** .005**
Married .001 -.103** -.093** -.287**
Farm size -.157** .152** .069** .121**
Children .142** .007 -.085** -.002
Health insurance .349** -.423** .148 -.106**
San Diego-Tijuana -.049
Calexico-Mexicali -.825**
El Paso-Ciudad Juárez -.371**
Laredo-Nuevo Laredo -.013
McAllen-Reynosa .009
Brownsville-Matamoros -.166**
Constant -1.212** -2.976** 1.569** -3.378**
Observations 311, 988 22, 529 49, 773 439, 141
Chi-squared 1351** 1673** 977** 6131*
Pseudo-R2 .04 .11 .04 .03
Source: Own estimations with data from American Community Survey (2008) and Encuesta
Nacional de Ocupación y Empleo (2008).
Notes: * and ** denote significance at 5% and 1%, respectively.
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computed, wage equations 4 and 5 are regressed using as independent variables
gender; years of schooling; years of experience; years of experience squared; the
interaction of gender with schooling, experience, and experience squared; and
eight dummies for industry sector.13
Equations 4 and 5 coefficient estimates are displayed in Table 3. The
first panel displays regressions for nonmigrants, and the second panel
displays regressions for migrants. We use such coefficient estimates to predict
biased-corrected “origin” and “destination” wages for migrants and for
nonmigrants.14
The sign and significance of the estimated coefficients of the inverse
Mills ratio (Lambda) tell us the existence of self-selection and whether it is
positive or negative. Positive coefficients indicate positive self-selection. All
regressions present statistically significant inverse Mills ratio coefficients,
implying the presence of self-selection in all cases. The coefficients obtained
suggest the presence of negative self-selection into the migrants’ group
(equation 5) for the first and second steps and positive self-selection into the
migrants’ group for the third step. Migrants from the interior of Mexico to
the Mexican side of the border and migrants who cross the United
States–Mexico border have lower earning capabilities than nonmigrants
(negative self-selection), while migrants from the U.S. side of the border to the
interior of the United States have higher earnings capabilities than those who
stay on the U.S. side of the border (positive self-selection).15 We also found
negative self-selection for the whole Mexico–United States migration
phenomenon (fourth column).16
Table 4 reports estimated inverse Mills ratio coefficients for nonmigrants
and migrants for every migration step, dividing the sample into smaller
13 Border city-pair dummies and state dummies are also included when possible, but because of
space limitations, their coefficients are not displayed in the table. Border city-pair dummies are
included to take into account regional wage differences along the United States–Mexico border.
14 For example, the first column of Table 3 considers only migration fromMexico to the Mexican
side of the border. The nonmigrants’ regression (first panel) includes only nonmigrant workers,
but its estimated coefficients are used to predict “origin” wages for migrants. Similarly, migrants’
regression (second panel) includes only migrant workers, but its estimated coefficients are used to
predict “destination” wages for nonmigrants.
15 For the first and second steps, the sign of the inverse Mills ratio coefficient estimates for the
nonmigrants’ group (equation 4) and for the migrants’ group (equation 5) oppose each other. We
have positive self-selection into the nonmigrants’ group but negative self-selection into the
migrants’ group. Intuitively this means that people who actually stay earn relatively more in
Mexico than migrants if such migrants were in Mexico. Similarly, people who actually crossed the
border earn relatively less in the United States than nonmigrants if such nonmigrants were in the
United States.
16Negative self-selection is consistent with the findings of Borjas (1996) and Orrenius and
Zavodny (2000). However, other authors, such as Chiquiar and Hanson (2005), have found
positive self-selection. Overall, it seems that discrepancies in the selectivity of migrants can be
attributed partially to the source of the data used; papers that find negative selection tend to use
Mexican data, while papers that find positive selection tend to use U.S. data.
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subgroups of Mexican-born workers: all workers (as shown in Tables 2
and 3), noncitizen workers, and noncitizen workers who do not speak English.
The numbers suggest that the presence of self-selection (both positive
and negative) is smaller when considering more disadvantaged groups of
workers.
With the biased-corrected wages for migrants and nonmigrants, we can
compare wages of identical individuals in the “origin” and “destination” for
every migration step. In addition, we can compare wages for specific subgroups
Table 3. Stayers and Migrants Wage Regression Equations 4 and 5,
Mexican-Born Workers
Mexico to
Border
Cross
Border
Border to
United States
Mexico to
United States
Equation 4: Nonmigrants’ ln(wage)
Gender .139** .007 .308** .114**
Education .069** .071** .091** .069**
Experience .019** .016** .022** .020**
Experience squared .000** .000** .000 .000**
Gender ¥ education -.005** .003 -.024** -.003**
Gender ¥ experience .004** .012** .011 .006**
Gender ¥ experience squared .000** .000** .000 .000**
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Border city dummies No Yes No No
State dummies Yes No Yes No
Lambda 1.426** .518** 3.569** -1.212**
Constant -1.666** -.775** -4.585** .533**
Observations 302, 337 18, 355 4, 174 389, 368
F-value 1526** 281** 41** 4354**
Pseudo-R2 .37 .36 .18 .33
Equation 5: migrants’ ln(wage)
Gender -.002 .250* .084** .081**
Education .064** .070** .046** .039**
Experience .014** .022** .021** .022**
Experience squared .000** .000 .000** .000**
Gender ¥ education .001 -.017** -.007** -.005**
Gender ¥ experience .013** .012 .012** .013**
Gender ¥ experience squared .000** .000 .000** .000**
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Border city dummies No Yes No No
State dummies Yes No Yes No
Lambda -1.226** -2.155** 2.443** -.882**
Constant -1.050** -.655** 1.977** .705**
Observations 9, 651 4, 174 45, 599 49, 773
F-value 148** 43** — 380**
Pseudo-R2 .32 .23 .16 .15
Source: Own estimations with data from American Community Survey (2008) and Encuesta
Nacional de Ocupación y Empleo (2008).
Notes: * and ** denote significance at 5% and 1%, respectively.
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of Mexican-born workers. Table 5 reports mean wage ratios for the three
migration steps and for the total Mexico–United States migration. Wage ratios
are computed dividing the biased-corrected wage of a worker in the destination
by the biased-corrected wage of such worker in the origin. Table 5 also reports
mean wage ratios for workers with three different levels of education: up to five
years of schooling (elementary school dropouts), six to eleven years of schooling
(elementary school graduates to high school dropouts), and twelve years or
more of schooling (high school graduates and above).
The wage ratio for the first migration step is 1.22. This means that on
average, after controlling for observable and unobservable individual
characteristics, a worker will increase her or his labor earnings by 22 percent
when moving from the interior of Mexico to the Mexican side of the border.
Wage gains for going to the Mexican side of the border are larger for less
educated workers.
Crossing the border is, by far, the most profitable of the three migration
steps. On average, after controlling for observable and unobservable
characteristics, a Mexican-born worker increases her or his wage 4.15 times just
by crossing the United States–Mexico border. Also in this case, the wage gains
are larger for less educated workers (4.94) than for more educated workers
Table 4. Inverse Mill Ratio Estimated Coefficients from Wage Equations 4 and 5
Nonmigrants Wage
Equation 4
Migrants Wage
Equation 5
Lambda Obs Adj-R2 Lambda Obs Adj-R2
Step 1: Moving to the border
Interior Mexico to Mexican side
of the border
1.426** 302,337 .37 -1.226** 9,651 .32
Step 2: Crossing the border
Mexican-born workers .518** 18,355 .36 -2.155** 4,174 .23
Mexican-born not citizen workers .642** 18,355 .36 -1.599** 2,526 .21
Mexican-born not citizen not
English speaking
1.279** 18,355 .36 -1.059* 1,465 .20
Step 3: Moving to the U.S. interior
Mexican-born workers 3.569** 4,174 .18 2.443** 45,599 .16
Mexican-born not citizen workers 3.211** 2,526 .16 1.961** 33,325 .13
Mexican-born not citizen not
English speaking
3.020** 1,465 .17 1.502** 19,635 .12
All steps: From Mexico to United States
Mexican-born workers -1.212** 389,368 .33 -.882** 49,773 .15
Mexican-born not citizen workers -1.654** 389,368 .33 -.876** 35,851 .12
Mexican-born not citizen not
English speaking
-1.570** 389,368 .33 -.629** 21,100 .10
Source: Own estimations with data from American Community Survey (2008) and Encuesta
Nacional de Ocupación y Empleo (2008).
Notes: * and ** denote significance at 5% and 1%, respectively.
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(3.57). The wage gains of crossing the border are higher for less educated
noncitizen Mexican-born workers (5.08) and even higher for less educated
non-English-speaking Mexican-born workers (5.26). However, the wage gains
of crossing the border for more educated, noncitizen Mexican-born workers are
smaller (3.15), and those for more educated noncitizen, non-English-speaking
Mexican-born workers are even smaller (2.66).
Moving from the U.S. side of the United States–Mexico border to the
interior of the United States represents a wage gain of about 12 percent (1.12).
The wage ratio is almost the same for noncitizen workers and for non-English-
speaking workers. Just as for the second step, moving wage gains are larger for
unskilled workers (1.26) and even larger for the legal ones.17
ForMexican-born workers, the wage benefits of moving from the interior of
Mexico to the Mexican side of the border are larger than the wage benefits of
moving from the U.S. side of the border to the interior of the United States (1.22
versus 1.12). For U.S.-born workers, the wage benefits of moving from the U.S.
side of the border to the interior of the United States are considerably smaller
(1.03).
17 The number 1.26 in Table 5 includes all Mexican-born workers, citizen and noncitizen, so the
wage ratio should be even larger if we considered only the citizen ones.
Table 5. Wage Ratios Corrected for Self-Selection
Mean Wage Ratios
By Years of Schooling
Total0-5 5-11
12 or
more
Step 1: Moving to the border
Interior of Mexico to Mexican side of the border 1.23 1.23 1.22 1.22
Step 2: Crossing the border
Mexican-born workers 4.94 4.38 3.57 4.15
Mexican-born not citizen workers 5.08 4.20 3.15 3.92
Mexican-born not citizen not English speaking workers 5.26 4.00 2.66 3.67
Step 3: Moving to the U.S. interior
Mexican-born workers 1.26 1.14 1.07 1.12
Mexican-born not citizen workers 1.20 1.13 1.09 1.12
Mexican-born not citizen not English-speaking workers 1.15 1.11 1.09 1.11
American workers 1.08 1.03 1.04 1.04
All steps: From Mexico to United States
Mexican-born workers 6.58 5.66 4.50 5.34
Mexican-born not citizen workers 6.55 5.43 4.07 5.07
Mexican-born not citizen not English-speaking workers 6.64 5.13 3.51 4.74
Source: Own estimations with data from American Community Survey (2008) and Encuesta
Nacional de Ocupación y Empleo (2008).
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Table 6. Wage Ratios Corrected for Self-Selection by Border City-Pair
Mean Wage Ratios
San Diego
Tijuana
Calexico
Mexicali
El Paso
Cd. Juárez
Laredo
N. Laredo
McAllen
Reynosa
Brownsville
Matamoros
Step 2: Crossing the
border
Mexican-born
workers
4.70 3.77 3.88 4.15 3.52 4.24
Mexican-born not
citizen workers
4.43 3.51 3.72 4.06 3.32 3.89
Mexican-born not
citizen not English
speaking
4.12 3.38 3.45 3.99 3.16 3.55
Source: Own estimations with data from American Community Survey (2008) and Encuesta
Nacional de Ocupación y Empleo (2008).
Figure 1.
Wage Ratio: Step 1—Moving to the Border
Source: Own estimations with data from American Community Survey (2008) and
Encuesta Nacional de Ocupación y Empleo (2008).
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We also calculated wage ratios for moving from any place in Mexico to any
place in the United States. On average, after controlling for individual
characteristics and self-selection, Mexican workers increase their wages 5.34
times by moving to the United States. Wage gains are larger for unskilled
workers (6.58) and even larger for the illegal ones (6.64). Skilled workers obtain
better wage increments migrating legally to the United States than illegally,
while unskilled workers have such low wages in Mexico that they are much
better off migrating to the United States even if they go illegally and do not
speak any English.
Finally, Table 6 displays estimated wage ratios for crossing the border for
the six more important city-pairs in the United States–Mexico border: San
Diego-Tijuana, Calexico-Mexicali, El Paso-Ciudad Juárez, Laredo-Nuevo
Laredo, McAllen-Reynosa, and Brownsville-Matamoros. As expected (and as a
result of the important regional economic differences along the United
States–Mexico border), moving from Tijuana to San Diego increases the wage
of a Mexican worker 4.7 times, while moving from Reynosa to McAllen
Figure 2.
Wage Ratio: Step 2—Crossing the Border
Source: Own estimations with data from American Community Survey (2008) and
Encuesta Nacional de Ocupación y Empleo (2008).
Aguayo-Téllez / Rivera-Mendoza / WAGE BENEFITS OFMEXICAN-U.S. MIGRATION | 135
increases her or his wage 3.52 times. In all cases and as shown before, wage gains
are larger for legal and English-speaking workers.
Figures 1 to 4 present migration wage ratios by years of schooling and by
male and female Mexican-born workers. Figure 1 shows wage ratios for the first
migration step. Wage gains for moving from the interior of Mexico to the
Mexican side of the United States–Mexico border are larger for men than for
women but decrease with schooling. After twelve years of education, the wage
gain of the first migration step stays flat for men and decreases for women. This
result may reflect the presence of “maquiladoras” in the border cities that hire
middle-skilled women. Figure 2 shows wage ratios for crossing the border.
Similar to the first step, wage gains are larger for men than for women and for
unskilled workers. Figure 3 presents wage ratios for the last migration step.
Similar to the first two steps, wage gains are larger for unskilled workers, but in
this case, women increase their wages relatively more than men when going to
the interior of the United States. In total, Figure 4 shows that unskilled workers
have higher wage gains than skilled workers when migrating fromMexico to the
United States and that men have higher gains than women.
Figure 3.
Wage Ratio: Step 3—Moving to the U.S. Interior
Source: Own estimations with data from American Community Survey (2008) and
Encuesta Nacional de Ocupación y Empleo (2008).
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Conclusions
Using the ACS of the United States and the Mexican Survey of Occupation
and Employment (ENOE), both for the year 2008, this article compares wages
for similar Mexican-born workers along their migration journey from Mexico
to the United States. On average, after correcting for self-selection and other
unobservable characteristics, a Mexican worker increases her or his wage 22
percent by moving from the interior ofMexico to theMexican side of the United
States–Mexico border, 315 percent by crossing the border, and 12 percent by
going from the U.S. side of the border to the interior of the United States. In all
cases, gains are larger for unskilled workers. Gains for crossing the border are
larger for men and for illegal workers, while gains for going to the interior of the
United States are larger for women and for legal workers.
As expected, crossing the border represents, by far, the largest wage gain for
any Mexican migrant. The costs of crossing it are so large that wage benefits
ought to compensate for them. Regional wage differences in Mexico are so
important that moving from the interior of Mexico to the Mexican side of the
Figure 4.
Wage Ratio: All Steps—From Mexico to the United States
Source: Own estimations with data from American Community Survey (2008) and
Encuesta Nacional de Ocupación y Empleo (2008).
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border provides larger wage benefits than moving from the U.S. side of the
border to the interior of the United States.
The wage benefits of crossing the border are relatively smaller than the wage
benefits of going from the interior of Mexico to the interior of the United States
(even after controlling for transportation costs). A smaller wage differential at
the border region may imply wage convergence and labor and economic
integration on the border. A policy question coming from this issue is whether
wage convergence in the border region implies future integration for the rest of
the economies. Decreasing transportation costs, higher mobility of goods and
capital, and a rapid economic and cultural integration at the border region will
provide a solid background for North American economic integration.
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